In his book Anarchy, State, and Utopia the famous libertarian philosopher Robert Nozick put forward a thought experiment called the “experience machine”. With this experiment, which asked if there were reasons one might choose not to enter a pleasure generating machine, Nozick sought to critique the belief of utilitarians that happiness is the only good. The society presented by Aldus Huxley in Brave New World can be seen as a kind of happiness generating machine. Its authors, like the controller Mustapha, share with utilitarians the belief that morality is defined by maximizing happiness. In chapter 17, the savage and the controller contest this issue. Three points are convincingly argued by the controller. Firstly, supposedly deeper kinds of human happiness are just responses to hardship that vanish without loss in the face of plenty. Secondly, the character building aspects of struggle are similarly useless when all desires are accounted for. Finally, human desires might include a need for negative emotions, but these too can be simulated by a chemical therapy. With The World State defended against the savage’s critiques he (and the reader) still feels uneasy with its artificially generated happiness. This uneasiness stems from an overdeveloped ability to recognize deception, a condition that makes us irrationally fearful of what we perceive to be inauthentic.
Linda, while in the grips of soma intoxication, is described as bearing an “expression of imbecile happiness”. (Huxley, 175) Is “imbecile happiness” the only kind of happiness on offer in Brave New World? Are the pleasures available to the citizens of The World State frivolous, vacuous, and ultimately unsatisfying? The savage thinks so. To compare their world with the past the controller reads a passage from William James’ The varieties of Religious Experience. He quotes “we inevitably turn to God; for this religious sentiment is of its nature so pure, so delightful to the soul that experiences it, that it makes up to us for all our other losses”. (Huxley, 206) The savage contends that religion provides a deeper and therefore more fulfilling form of happiness than anything in the new world. Mustapha counters that the people of The World State have “youth and prosperity right up to the end”. (Huxley, 206) Their lives, free from the anxiety and tumult of earlier human existence, no longer require the concept of a monotheistic deity for comfort. Here Huxley is channelling Marx who proclaimed that religion was the opiate of the masses. In Brave New World a drug literally fills the role of religion, making religion superfluous.
Religion, however, is not the only elevated form of human activity that could mean a greater type of pleasure than Soma and promiscuity. Philosophy, the questioning of existence and the assumptions of society, has been seen throughout human history as one of the noblest pursuits. Mustapha’s answer is that philosophy and critical thought do not really bring about greater states of happiness; they are simply responses to environments and societies that are not meeting individual needs. Mustapha asks “What need have we of repose when our minds and bodies continue to delight in activity? of consolation, when we have soma? of something immovable, when there is the social order”. (Huxley, 206) In other words, there is no longer a need for speculation about “immovable” universal human principals, when a social order exists that perfectly meets the desires of its citizens. There is no new Karl Marx after communism has been achieved. What is the point of revolutionary thought after the need for revolution has been removed. “God isn’t compatible with machinery and scientific medicine and universal happiness” continues Mustapha. (Huxley, 207) In this context “God” is interchangeable with any questioning of humanity’s place in the universe. According to Mustapha when all requirements of happiness are met no one will engage in this activity.
As their dialogue continues the savage argues that nobility of human character is essential for happiness and that this can only be achieved through suffering. He quotes a line from Shakespeare’s Othello, saying “If after every tempest came such calms, may the winds blow till they have wakened death.” (Huxley, 210) For the savage, human happiness is greatest when paired with suffering. Struggling for our desires makes experiencing them all the richer. Indeed, he believes that a price ought to be paid for pleasure – that happiness has to be earned. To this effect he chides the controller “nothing costs enough here”. (Huxley, 211) Mustapha points out that there are some limits imposed on society, for it is still tethered to the bounds of “hygiene and economics”. (Huxley, 209) However, he disagrees with the notion that pleasure ought to be tied to suffering and ought to have a cost. “You can carry at least half your morality about in a bottle. Christianity without tears – that’s what soma is” he says. (Huxley, 210) This speaks to the controller’s utilitarian conception of morality. Utilitarianism is the ethical theory that maximization of happiness is the sole factor in determining whether or not an act is moral. That is, it does not matter how happiness is maximized, just that it is maximized. Hearing the controller’s arguments the savage challenges that true moral character (like courage) can only be developed in the face of deprivation. (Huxley, 209) An implicit premise of this assertion is that greater happiness will be derived (for the individual and society) if these characteristics exist. The controller responds that such moral characteristics as the savage holds in esteem are only necessary to help alleviate suffering. They remedy the very deprivation that the savage proposes generates estimable moral characteristics. (Huxley, 210) Therefore, Mustapha argues, characteristics like courage become unnecessary (even undesirable) in the new order.
Having had his criticisms easily dealt with by Mustapha the savage asserts that suffering has intrinsic worth, and thus, he reveals his real concern with the brave new world, that it is inauthentic. Is there not pleasure in “living dangerously” asks the savage. (Huxley, 211) Mustapha has an answer for this as well: “Violent Passion Surrogate” treatment. (Ibid.) This treatment allows citizens to experience rage and fear without the inconvenience and riskiness of actually being in dangerous or rage provoking situations. This is a final, forceful, response to a nagging question unanswered so far in the debate. Maybe happiness somehow loses its lustre without periods of corresponding unhappiness, or perhaps emotions like rage and fear add zest to an otherwise comfortable but boring life. Either way, whatever value negative emotions might have the controller points out that they too can be simulated. After answering the problems raised the controller concludes that all the savage is really after is the right to be unhappy. (Huxley, 12) What is at stake for the savage is the authenticity of the happiness in The World State. For him, authentic happiness involves struggle and is inherently superior to the happiness simulated by drugs, as well as biological and social engineering. Is the savage irrational for holding this position? The controller has dealt so thoroughly with his complaints that it is difficult to see why the freedom of authentic happiness should be preferred over artificially simulated happiness.
If utilitarianism is right it is hard to argue with a world where the vast majority are happy. Though religion and philosophy no longer exist, they are not needed (nor desired). If The World State’s citizens lack moral virtue it is irrelevant in an environment devoid of scarcity or conflict. Finally, if there is truth to the idea that negative emotions are required to fully experience happiness, then those can be simulated as well. Does Brave New World describe a utopia not a dystopia? Assuming everyone is truly happy then what is the problem? The answer lies in our psychology. As social animals evolution has made us adept at spotting dissimulation among our peers. This craving for the authentic is similar to our craving for sugar. An appreciation for sweetness had the adaptive function of causing our ancestors to prefer foods dense in energy, but the same desire in the modern environment now leads to diabetes and obesity. The same is true of our desire for the authentic which makes us so good at ferreting-out cheats. Brave New World is read as (and was written with the intention of being) a dystopia because it is not authentic. We see the world it presents as too-easy, “too good to be true”, and attempt to find ways it is deceiving us. Our inability to accept a superior, but simulated reality is not rational, but the result of once-useful and currently outmoded psychology.
To make this clearer imagine a version of Nozick’s thought experiment. Consider being given the choice to enter a virtual reality machine that lets you live a better version of your current life. Everything is the same, but you now have just inherited a fortune from a long-lost relative.[1] No loved ones will be left behind, because perfect clones (with no knowledge of what has occurred) will replace those who decide to enter the machine. From a utilitarian perspective one should choose to enter the machine because it will maximize happiness in the world. It seems rational to enter the machine, yet most find this disturbing. Our intuition is that there must be something wrong with a world that is not authentic.
Chapter 17 of Brave New Worldis about utilitarianism. Essentially, the savage is attempting to problamatize utilitarian logic, but his attempts are futile – happiness is all that matters. Bereft of reasoned arguments what remains for him is an irrational fear of the inauthentic.
[1] To be charitable to the spirit of the thought experiment, just insert any small or large change that would realistically make life better.
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